Abstract: The implementation of a copyright protection reform in Sweden in April 2009 suddenly increased the risk of being caught and prosecuted for illegal file sharing. This paper uses the reform to investigate the effects of illegal file sharing on music and movie sales. We find that the reform decreased Internet traffic by 16 percent during the subsequent six months. It also increased music sales by 36 percent. Furthermore, it had no significant effects on movie sales. We conclude that pirated music is a strong substitute to legal music whereas the substitutability is less for movies.
INTRODUCTION
Copyright protection of information goods is a topic that has been debated at least since the invention of the printing press in the 15 th century. The non-rival nature of information goods means that there is a tradeoff between proper incentives to creators and public benefits from the wider distribution of works (see, e.g., Plant 1934; Hurt and Schuchman 1966; Boldrin and Levine 2002; Varian 2005) . The level of intellectual property protection has important welfare implications. Inventions such as the photocopier, CD burners, and the Internet have made the copying of books, music, and movies inexpensive and easy and the enforcement of copyright more difficult. 1 It could be argued that music and movies in practice have become public goods. In view of these developments, guidelines for and evaluation of intellectual property rights policies are more important than ever. Knowledge about the effects of illegal copying on legal sales and the effectiveness of copyright protection policies is fundamental for welfare analyses of these issues. During the last decade, the debate has focused on the recorded music and movie industries. Global sales of recorded music amounted to over USD 25 billion in 1999 at the trade level after a steady and continuous rise in the 1990s. The pattern was similar for movie sales. In June 1999, however, the online music file sharing service Napster popularized file sharing to a wide audience. Since then, the music and movie markets have evolved differently. Global sales of recorded music fell by 30 percent between 1999 and 2009 whereas global movie theater ticket sales grew by 75 percent. Interest groups for both industries claim that illegal file sharing of copyright-protected material, commonly referred to as "piracy", damages the economy. Several file sharing services including Napster have also been forced to shut down by court order due to legal actions taken by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).
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In this paper, we empirically investigate the effects of copyright protection reform on Internet piracy and sales of music and movies, and then use these results to calculate the implied effect of piracy on music and movie sales.
A key requirement of an empirical investigation to identify causal effects is to isolate a random variation in piracy. Otherwise, any observed correlations between piracy and sales may stem from variations in sources such as Internet activity unrelated to piracy, cultural trends, demographics, or macroeconomics. Experimental-like variation in piracy is, however, difficult to find, and serious doubts can be raised about causal interpretations of the estimates from most existing studies.
We use the implementation of a law in Sweden on April 1, 2009, which made illegal file sharing costlier in terms of the perceived risk of being prosecuted, as a natural experiment. The reform attracted wide media coverage by all major news media in Sweden and internationally around the time of implementation. Overnight, the reform diminished Internet traffic in Sweden by 40 percent. Because the law did not concern any Internet activities unrelated to piracy, the drop provides an estimate of the reform's effect on piracy alone. Internet traffic did not recover to pre-reform levels until the end of 2009. Hence, the reform provides a large and unprecedented experimental-like variation in piracy both in terms of size and length of time.
We use a difference-in-differences strategy with Norway and Finland as control groups to estimate the reform effect on piracy and music and movie sales. We find that the reform decreased Internet traffic by 16 percent, corresponding to a decrease in piracy by 32 percent, during the subsequent six months. It also increased sales of music by 36 percent. Furthermore, it had no statistically significant effects on movie sales. We conclude that pirated music is a strong substitute to legal music whereas the substitutability is less for movies. These results are corroborated by survey-based evidence on individual file sharing and music consumption behavior in Sweden prior to and after the reform. We also find that the reform effects more or less disappeared after six months except for digital music sales. This raises some doubts regarding the effectiveness of such law reforms in the long run, but it also points towards better legal alternatives to piracy as a possible way forward for the music industry.
By now, there are a considerable number of studies devoted to investigating and understanding the economic effects of piracy. Dejean (2009) provides a review of the existing literature. To the extent that duplicated material available through file sharing is a substitute to legal purchases, economic theory predicts a negative effect of piracy on music and movie sales. Theoretical research, however, shows that there are potential mechanisms that may induce an opposite effect, i.e., the sampling effect, where piracy may provide a sampling opportunity for consumers and raise the willingness to pay for goods that they know match their preferences better (Takeyama 1994; Duchêne and Waelbroeck 2006) . The sign of the relationship is therefore an open empirical issue.
For music sales, most empirical studies find an overall negative effect, 3 while one study (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 2007) finds no effects, and some studies that allow for heterogeneous effects find positive effects for some groups. 4 For movie sales, the results are more ambiguous. Some studies find negative effects 5 that are smaller than what is usually found for music sales, and others find positive or no effects. 6 Most previous empirical studies use individual-level survey data. 7 However, piracy by some individuals affects music consumption by other individuals, e.g., because friends play music to each other, and such individual general-equilibrium cross effects are difficult to account for properly. Other difficulties include measurement errors on infrequent purchases and reliability issues for survey responses about illegal behavior. Other studies use city-or country-level Internet penetration measures as proxies for piracy in combination with aggregate sales. 8 However, Internet penetration does not fully capture Internet traffic intensity (e.g., Internet penetration did not vary after our reform whereas Internet traffic did).
3 E.g., Peitz and Waelbroeck 2004; Blackburn 2006; Bounie et al. 2006; Michel 2006; Rob and Waldfogel 2006; Zentner 2006; Bhattacharjee et al. 2007; Liebowitz 2008; Hong forthcoming. 4 E.g., Boorstin 2004; Bounie et al. 2005 . 5 E.g., Bounie et al. 2006; De Vany and Walls 2007; Rob and Waldfogel 2007. 6 E.g., Smith and Telang 2009a; 2009b. 7 E.g., Bounie et al. 2006; Michel 2006; Rob and Waldfogel 2006; Zentner 2006; Hong forthcoming. 8 E.g., Peitz and Waelbroeck 2004; Liebowitz 2008; Smith and Telang 2009a; 2009b. Three studies use a natural experiment approach and data on estimated downloads at the album level from a file sharing network to measure piracy in combination with album-level sales. Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) use German school holidays in 2002 as an instrument for file sharing among Americans, arguing that German kids spending more time on their computers enhance the speed and availability of music files for American downloaders. They find no effects of piracy on sales. Blackburn (2006) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2007) study the decrease in piracy among Americans that was induced by RIAA announcements of a lawsuit strategy against illegal file sharers in 2003, and the subsequent increase induced by a later announcement that only major offenders were in danger. In contrast to Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, these papers allow for heterogeneous effects depending on popularity. Blackburn finds a negative effect for popular albums and a positive effect for less popular albums while Bhattacharjee et al. find that only less popular albums are hurt in terms of survival time on sales charts.
A single file sharing network, however, may not be representative because different networks specialize in different kinds of activities. It is also impossible to identify complete downloads for technical reasons and because illegal file sharers want to hide their activities. Furthermore, piracy of specific albums affects sales of other albums, e.g., because listening to an album in a certain genre may affect a user's tastes regarding other albums in that genre, and such album general-equilibrium cross effects are difficult to account for. Finally, all albums cannot be covered.
Our data and methodology are an improvement over the existing literature in several ways. We are the first to use a measure of aggregate Internet traffic in a country to capture aggregate piracy. Combining this with aggregate sales allows a better estimation of the full effect, which accounts for any cross effects. Our natural experiment approach is also the first to incorporate genuinely untreated control groups (i.e., neighboring countries).
9 These controls account for trends and seasonal factors. We also contribute to the existing literature by providing an up-to-date study that uses recent data representative of modern piracy and the entertainment industry. Previous studies almost exclusively investigate the early 2000s, which is an interesting period when piracy emerged and music sales began falling. But Internet capacity has expanded fast, and piracy has evolved towards using newer technologies. In particular, no previous studies pay attention to the BitTorrent-based piracy that dominates today or the legal digital alternatives to piracy that have gained important market shares.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a background on file sharing and the reform. Section three describes the data and graphically investigates the development of Internet traffic and music and movie sales. That section also provides an informal and nontechnical analysis that discloses the main results in an intuitive way. Section four outlines in detail the identification strategy and presents the regression specifications. Section five reports the regression estimates. The last section concludes.
BACKGROUND File sharing
Although people have been copying music illegally since the 1960s using analog tapes, digital piracy (which allows easy reproduction without a loss of quality) became feasible in the mid to late 1990s through the availability of affordable CD burners and the Internet in conjunction with the mp3 file format for compressing digital music. Piracy exploded when Napster was introduced in June 1999 and allowed individuals to easily search for and download music files indexed on a central server. Although Napster was shut down in 2001 after a legal battle with the recording industry, it was followed by many similar services, e.g., Gnutella, Kazaa, and Grokster. These modern services use peer-to-peer (P2P) technology in which users download files directly from each other and not from a central server.
Although initially mainly music was shared on the P2P networks, the general increase in Internet speed during the 2000s together with the development of more efficient video encoding techniques made it feasible to also share movies and TV shows. In 2001, the BitTorrent protocol was released. With previous P2P protocols, popular files were sometimes hard to get because users queued up to download from the suppliers. With BitTorrent, all users downloading a file both upload and download pieces of the file simultaneously in a decentralized fashion so that the more popular a file is, the faster the download becomes. In 2002, the first major BitTorrent tracker, Suprnova, was started, and the Sweden-based site The Pirate Bay followed in 2003, becoming the largest BitTorrent site in terms of traffic in 2008 (Alexa) when it reached 25 million unique peers (The Pirate Bay). The speed and availability provided by the BitTorrent protocol has made it the most popular protocol used by P2P networks today (Schultze and Mochalski 2007; .
During the last decade, the recorded music and movie industries ramped up their legal battle against file sharing networks by shutting down several large tracker sites from 2004 onwards. The piracy issue has received great attention over the last five years starting with the police raid against The Pirate Bay on March 31, 2006, wherein servers were confiscated. Law suits and trials followed with hearings starting on February 16, 2009. Four site operators were found guilty on April 17, 2009, less than a month after the law reform that we use, but the site continues to operate.
Sweden is one of the most developed countries in the world in terms of Internet penetration. It is among the top ten with respect to density of broadband subscribers, percentage fiber among broadband connections, and broadband access density among households. Sweden is therefore of interest for other countries because it is on the IT frontlines and provides a forecast for countries less developed in this respect. Although the reform seemed fairly harmless to individual file-sharers ex-post, the perceived threat ex-ante was large as the 40 percent reduction in Internet traffic shows, and it is this threat we estimate and use. Although IPRED is not the first legal reform concerning file sharing, incidental evidence and public perception suggest that this reform is likely to have had a strong deterring effect on piracy and is much more forceful than any previous reforms in Sweden due to the relatively strong formulation of the Swedish law together with the highly publicized trial of The Pirate Bay, which was conducted during the weeks around the implementation of the law. There was strong public opinion against the law, which culminated in the Swedish elections to the European parliament on June 7, 2009, where the single-issue Pirate Party received 7 percent of the total vote and a seat in the European parliament.
The IPRED law
The institutional development, however, suggests some need for carefulness in the empirical analysis and in the interpretation of the results. Because the law was passed more than a month before the implementation, it is plausible that there might have been anticipatory effects. File sharers may have tried to stock up on downloadable music and movies when anticipating the implementation. We have examined this hypothesis and find no support for anticipatory behavior. Because the legal processes have been slow and nobody has yet been convicted, it is plausible that people came to reevaluate the risk of getting caught, reconsidered their initial fears, and started to share files again a few months later. The reform effect may hence have been heterogeneous over time, and we allow for this in the analysis.
DATA

Internet traffic
We use data on aggregate Internet traffic through Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). We capture changes in piracy by assuming that changes in Internet traffic after the reform (after accounting for time effects) can be attributed to changes in piracy alone. Because the reform provides variation at the country level, we use data at this level to avoid complications in the estimation due to correlation between local units.
The Internet is, loosely speaking, a network of networks. An IXP connects the smaller networks to each other. For a more detailed description of how the Internet and IXPs work, see Appendix A. Traffic between two users on the same network does not, however, pass through IXPs. For the results to be representative for all traffic, it is necessary that the relative reform effect on piracy is the same for between-and within-network piracy. This is most likely to hold because BitTorrent, the most popular P2P protocol by far, does not allow users to select where to download from. All downloads usually involve within-and betweennetwork traffic, and users cannot select the share of each kind of traffic to use. Furthermore, the law does not discriminate between different kinds of traffic. It is possible that different shares of within-and between-network traffic are piracy. This is, however, not a problem as long as the relative response in piracy due to the reform is the same.
It is possible that some file sharers simply started hiding their activity using technical solutions such as proxy servers or VPN networks 14 in response to the reform. A strength of our indirect measure of file sharing is that this traffic would still be picked up as Internet traffic. If anything, a switch to these technologies would make file sharing traffic more likely to pass between networks, and thus be picked up by our IXP data causing a downward bias of our estimate of the effects of the reform on piracy.
We have a weekly Internet traffic panel for Sweden, Norway, and Finland for 2009. The data are in weekly averages and are measured in gigabits per second (Gbps). The data come from the largest IXPs in Sweden, Norway, and Finland. The Swedish data are provided by Netnod, the Norwegian data by Norwegian Internet Exchange (NIX), and the Finnish data by Finnish Communication and Internet Exchange (FICIX). These IXPs provide the vast majority of between-network connections in their respective countries.
The development of Internet traffic is plotted in Figure 1 . A solid line is used for Sweden, a dashed line for Norway, and a short-dashed line for Finland. A vertical line marks the last time point before the reform. Data series plots follow this structure throughout this section. 15 Neither Norway nor Finland shows such a drop at this date. In fact, there are no other changes of this magnitude between adjacent points in time in our data. Swedish Internet traffic recovered toward the end of the year. Some of this increase seems to be common for all countries. There are some time effects such as trends and seasonal effects when disregarding the post-reform period in Sweden. The trends look reasonably parallel for all three countries in the pre-reform period and between Norway and Finland in the post-treatment period. There are no signs of an anticipation effect near the end of February when the law was passed. Figure 2 and Figure 3 . 15 The drop was 40 percent on the reform day. Since the whole drop can be attributed to piracy, this share can be used as an estimate of the lower bound on piracy's share of pre-reform Internet traffic. 16 The average SEK/USD exchange rate was 7.6 in 2009. Digital music sales Sweden Norway Finland of second quarter troughs and last quarter peaks are also clear. Furthermore, the trend and seasonal patterns are, to some degree, country specific. The second quarter trough is, e.g., sharper in Sweden than in the other countries. Seasonal patterns may differ, e.g., if release patterns of new domestic albums are different between countries. In each of the first two quarters after the reform, sales increased compared to the same quarters in the previous year in Sweden, which is a pattern that cannot be found for any two consecutive quarters in the countries without a reform or in Sweden prior to the reform.
Music sales
Physical sales were SEK 689 million in Sweden, SEK 550 million in Norway, and SEK 365 million in Finland in 2009. Since physical sales make up most of total sales, the pattern is mostly similar to that discussed above. Digital sales were SEK 139 million in Sweden, SEK 98 million in Norway, and SEK 39 million in Finland in 2009. We see that sales trends were positive and not unlikely country-specific. The sales increase in Sweden after the reform is, however, a clear trend break. The increase in the three post-reform quarters does not have a counterpart elsewhere in the data.
We also analyze data on different subcategories of physical and digital sales. For physical sales, we have a partition along price levels, i.e., full-price, mid-price, and budget albums, and along artist of origin, i.e., domestic or international artists. For digital sales, the subcategories are streamed music, non-streamed music downloaded from the Internet, and non-streamed music downloaded from cell phones. In some cases comparable data for all countries are not available, and we then use data for a subset of countries.
Movie sales
For aggregate movie sales, we use monthly data from 2005 to 2009 for movie theater ticket sales and quarterly data from 2007 to 2009 for DVD movie sales. DVD sales accounted for 87 percent of total video sales in Sweden in 2009, so other formats are relatively unimportant (GfK Sweden). The third large market for the movie industry, video rentals, is left out of the analysis due to the lack of reliable data. However, video rentals are the smallest of these three markets; total sales were only 25 percent of the size of the theater ticket market and 16 percent of the size of the video sales market in Sweden in 2009 (Swedish Film Institute; Sveriges Videodistributörers Förening).
The Swedish ticket data were provided by the Swedish Film Institute and cover all Swedish movie theaters that provide public screenings. 17 The Norwegian ticket data were provided by Film and Kino and cover the 46 largest movie theaters in Norway, which account for around 90 percent of visits nationwide. The Finnish ticket data were provided by the Finnish Film Foundation and cover all cinemas in Finland. The DVD data were provided by the Swedish and Norwegian branches of the market research company GfK. The DVD data are estimates based on individual consumer survey panels consisting of around 5,000 random households in Sweden and around 3,000 random individuals in Norway. The ticket numbers are given at the consumer level 18 , and the DVD numbers are given at the trade level. The development of sales at the quarterly level is plotted in Figure 4 .
17 Screenings to which the general public can buy tickets. 18 These additionally include VAT and thus are not directly comparable to the music and DVD numbers. 
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We now turn our attention to quantifying the reform effects and indirectly the effects of piracy on music and movie sales. To identify the effect of piracy on music and movie sales, it is not enough to observe a correlation as this could arise from variations in other sources. For example, a great interest in music in a country at a certain point in time could cause high levels of piracy and music sales at the same time even absent any relationship between piracy and music sales. Alternatively, an economic recession could cause an increased level of piracy and a decreased level of music sales. To overcome these problems requires the isolation of exogenous variation in piracy that is as good as experimental, i.e., a ceteris paribus variation in piracy where every other source that may affect the outcome is held constant.
We use the IPRED reform to obtain such a variation in piracy. First, we estimate the impact of the reform on Internet traffic. Because the reform did not concern any Internet DVD movie sales Sweden Norway Finland activities unrelated to piracy, the drop provides an estimate of the reform effect on piracy alone. Then, we estimate the impact of the reform on music and movie sales. If the reform affected sales only through its effect on piracy, these estimates reflect the effect of the change in piracy caused by the reform. Since the only direct effect of the reform is the effect on piracy by making piracy seemingly riskier, this interpretation seems reasonable.
If the timing of the implementation was based on factors related to piracy, such factors may confound the reform estimates. We solve this by using Norway and Finland, two countries similar to Sweden in geographical, cultural, and technological aspects but without any reform at this time, as control groups to control for common trends and seasonal factors. Thus, we identify the reform effect on Internet traffic using a difference-in-differences approach.
We estimate the reform effect on piracy and sales using the following basic specification with ordinary least squares (OLS):
where is a country index and is a time period index. is the outcome variable which may be Internet traffic or different sales variables, and is a post-reform dummy variable. The variable is a time fixed effect, is a country fixed effect, and is an idiosyncratic error term. From Figures 1 to 4 , we see that some reform effects seem to vary over time, and we allow for heterogeneous effects over time in most specifications by using a post-reform dummy vector. We also see that some variables have country-specific seasonal patterns and trends, and we account for this in some specifications by additionally adding country-specific seasonal dummies and linear trends. 19 For causal inference, we formally require the reform to be uncorrelated with conditional on the other covariates. We assume a log-linear model, which accounts for scale and level differences in outcome variables between the countries. The reduced-form coefficients from this model have a proportional interpretation at the margin. For discrete variables, the coefficients can be transformed by an exponential to provide a non-marginal relative reform effect with an implicit constant marginal effect assumption (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980) . Serial correlation in the error term within units might be a concern. Clustering, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) , does not produce consistent standard errors when there are only at most three units. Collapsing data across time into a pre-and post-reform period would leave too few observations to construct standard errors in our case. An option is to use the Newey-West standard error correction (Newey and West 1987) , which requires specifying the length of the correlation over time. We have performed this correction allowing for correlations up to six months, and it turns out that those standard errors are very close to and usually smaller than the conventional OLS standard errors. Consequently, we report the more conservative uncorrected standard errors. 20 Nevertheless, the standard errors should be interpreted with some caution.
For the sales equations we also estimate placebo regressions where we place the reform in April 2008 and drop 2009 from the estimation. The purpose of the placebo tests is to examine whether statistical significance in the regressions is the result of random fluctuations. Statistically significant placebo estimates would indicate problems with type I errors.
To the extent that there may be spillover effects of the Swedish reform on its neighbors, the reform effect estimates would be downward biased. It is unlikely that the reform would directly influence file sharers in neighbor countries. However, the availability of files in a country may affect piracy in other countries because file sharing is a cross-national activity. Less piracy in Sweden can thus decrease the supply of pirated material for, e.g., Norway. This is, however, to some degree offset by traffic between Sweden and Norway being replaced by heavier traffic within Norway and between Norway and other countries. It is difficult to speculate on the degree of spillover effects. At least, there are no important immediate spillover effects at the reform date according to the development of Internet traffic in Figure  1 . For sales, there is no reason to expect any spillover effects, except those working through piracy.
The reform effect estimates of Internet traffic provide a lower bound of the reform effect on piracy. To get estimates of the reform effect on piracy we need to scale by piracy's share of all Internet traffic prior to the reform. We know of no estimates of this number for Sweden, but a report from the German Internet traffic analysis firm Ipoque (Schultze and Mochalski 2009) provides estimates of the proportion of Internet traffic that consists of file sharing in several European countries. Estimates for the Nordic countries are not provided, but the share is 53 percent in Germany, 70 percent in Eastern Europe, 55 percent in Southern Europe, and 54 percent in Southwestern Europe. Although there are legal uses for P2P technology, the vast majority of all file sharing consists of piracy. Since Sweden is probably similar to Germany in this respect, we assume the share to be 0.5. The results can easily be rescaled by a constant for the reader that finds this assumption implausible. 21 As we do not have standard errors for the rescaling factor, we simply treat it as a constant. The reform effects are of intrinsic interest. Under the assumption that the reform had the same relative effect across media, it is also possible to infer the effect of piracy on the sales of the different media as / . Estimating this quotient corresponds to an instrumental variables strategy where the reform is the instrument for piracy. Equation (1) then corresponds to the reduced-form equations and is the first-stage parameter. The identifying assumption is that the reform did not affect sales other than through its effect on 20 Angrist and Pischke (2008) recommend reporting the largest of the conventional and robust standard errors. 21 A hard lower bound would be 0.4, i.e., all piracy ceased after the reform. Conversely, a hard upper bound would be 1, i.e., all internet traffic is piracy. We believe that these assumptions are both unreasonable and focus on a number that has at least indirect empirical support.
piracy. There are several technical complications with this strategy and we only report the reduced-form estimates here as they are clear enough.
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Behavioral responses to the reform are not unlikely heterogeneous across individuals. Casual, small-scale file-sharers were probably more likely to be deterred by the reform than large-scale file sharing enthusiasts who have better knowledge of and access to technologies that make it harder to detect them. The implicit IV discussed in the previous paragraph would then be a local average treatment effect (LATE), with casual file sharers more likely being the compliers, while heavy users more likely are "never-takers" who do not reduce their activities in response to the reform. The casual users make up the vast majority of file sharers, and their file sharing is probably a closer substitute to buying music compared to heavy file sharers, since many of these users would not afford to buy all the music and movies they download illegally. For copyright protection reforms, our LATE is close to the most policy relevant parameter.
It would have been interesting to translate the reform effect on piracy into bounds on the number of songs or movies stolen and also the effect at the level of pirated units, i.e., the effect of a pirated unit on sales of that kind of units. However, this is complicated by several factors that together make the bounds too widespread to be informative. First, our measure of Internet traffic does not measure all traffic: it only measures traffic between networks. As discussed in the background section, the relative change in between-network piracy is a good proxy for the relative change in all piracy. To obtain the absolute levels of total piracy requires, however, an estimate on the share of traffic that is between-network traffic. Second, music and movie files come in different formats with a large variation in size of files, and the relative shares of different kinds of files are not known.
Third, many files are not completely downloaded, downloaded more than once, cannot be opened by some/any users, or do not contain the information some/all users expected. Fourth, many files that are downloaded are never "consumed", and some are consumed several times by the same or different individuals. Fifth, there are general equilibrium effects between different kinds of units. We cannot quantify any of those factors with any precision. Another issue is exactly how to define piracy: should it be started, completed, or consumed downloads? We therefore refrain from attempting to derive such bounds. This contrasts many other papers (e.g., Blackburn 2006; Rob and Waldfogel 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 2007 ) that estimate the individual behavioral effect at the level of pirated units but cannot say much about aggregate piracy.
RESULTS
Internet Traffic
22 Because of the need to rescale the first-stage coefficient and the fact that we use different samples and partially different control variables, it is not possible to use the standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. The two-sample instrumental variables procedure developed in Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Krueger (1992; 1995) is a possible route. This procedure was used in the working paper version of this paper (Adermon and Liang 2010) .
The reform effect estimates for Internet traffic and piracy, estimated using Equation (1), are reported in Table 1 . The quarterly relative reform effects are first reported followed by an estimate for the first half year after the reform in the Apr-Sep row, which provide a summary estimate of the reform effect. Specifications are varied horizontally. Baseline is the basic difference-in-differences specification. Trend adds a country specific time trend which is the preferred specification used in the rest of the columns. Piracy scales the Internet traffic estimates by two to provide an estimate of the effect on piracy, as discussed in the previous section. Swe-Nor only uses data from Sweden and Norway, Swe-Fin only uses data from Sweden and Finland, and Swe only only uses data from Sweden. The Internet traffic estimates are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level in each of the first two quarters and in the two quarters jointly in the baseline specification. The results are similar when trends are accounted for. The immediate reform effect in the first quarter is -20.9 percent, and falls to -10.6 percent in the second quarter after which the effect is not statistically significantly negative. The whole effect for the first six months prior to recovery is -15.9 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level. The corresponding piracy estimates are twice as large.
The effects are larger when Finland is used as the only control country than when using only Norway. The first quarter effects are similar (-18.3 versus -23.8 percent), but the effect disappears relative to Norway and not relative to Finland in the second quarter. Furthermore, the effects are positive and statistically significant in the third quarter in Norway, which may be an indication of this specification not being perfect or that Norway may not be the ideal control country. In any instance, the total effect for the first half year is negative and statistically significant irrespective of control country. The results using Swedish time series are qualitatively similar to the panel results. We have tried allowing anticipatory effects in March. This produces insignificant reform estimates in March, and the post-reform estimates are largely unchanged.
Although we can be very confident in interpreting the initial drop as a drop in piracy, interpretation of the later estimates as true reform effects requires us to assume that the composition of Internet traffic other than piracy has not changed differently between the countries. Although Internet traffic returned to its previous trajectory in late 2009, this could be due to people migrating to bandwidth-intensive legal Internet streaming services such as Spotify for music and Voddler for movies to a greater extent in Sweden than in its neighbors. This would produce a downward bias in the reform estimates for later periods. We focus on the first six months after the reform as piracy either recovered thereafter or our Internet traffic estimates measure piracy with a bias.
Music Sales
The reform effect estimates for total music sales are reported in Table 2 , which is similarly organized as Table 1 . Here, we also report the placebo estimates placing the reform one year before the actual reform, in April 2008, omitting observations from 2009 for all countries, in 2008 placebo. Since there are fewer degrees of freedom in the placebo regressions, coefficient and standard error estimates come with higher variability and are not completely comparable to the main estimates. We also add country-specific seasonal (monthly) dummies from specification Season and on forth. The reform estimates for the first six months are all positive and statistically significant at the one percent level across specifications. The effect increases when seasonal effects are accounted for and stays similar when trends are accounted for. The reform effect is 36.4 percent in the preferred specification. This increase is roughly the size of the estimated decrease of piracy of 31.8 percent. The effects are larger when Finland is used as the only control country than when Norway is used as the only control country, which is in line with the Internet traffic results. The time series results are again similar to the panel results. The placebo estimates have different signs, they are much smaller in magnitude, and they are not statistically significant in most cases. The quarter estimates are all positive and in most cases statistically significant at the one or five percent levels for the first two quarters, but they are smaller and statistically insignificant for the last quarter in most cases. This is consistent with the pattern for Internet traffic. We have also tried allowing anticipatory effects in March here as we did for Internet traffic. Again, this produces insignificant reform estimates in March without affecting the post-reform estimates much.
Our preferred estimates show that the reform decreased piracy and increased music sales by around 35 percent. This corresponds to a one percent to one percent displacement between piracy and music sales and a music sales elasticity of piracy of one. Under the strong functional form assumption that the marginal effects are constant, this implies that physical music sales would have been 100 percent larger if piracy did not exist and that 80 percent of the drop in music sales between 2000 and 2008 can be attributed to piracy. This would support the music industry's claim that piracy is the main cause of the decline. For countries with similar per capita sales and piracy as Sweden, these figures provide useful guidelines for the impact of piracy.
It is difficult to compare estimates between studies for several reasons. Comparing elasticities between samples is not meaningful since elasticities are not constant at the different levels of piracy between the samples. For example, it is not likely that doubling the amount of piracy has the same proportional effects on sales when piracy is high than when it is close to zero. Comparing marginal effects is more reasonable. However, without knowing the piracy levels in different countries and only having information on relative marginal effects, the comparison is problematic. The same relative effect of piracy on sales translates into different absolute effects of piracy on sales. In the following, relative marginal effects are compared with this complication in mind.
Most studies find that music sales would have been 0 to 40 percent higher in the absence of piracy in the U.S. at some point in time during the period 1998 to 2006 (the estimates in Oberholzer and Gee (2006) are on the lower end, and the estimates in Blackburn (2006) are on the higher end). In comparison, our estimates are on the higher end. However, Internet traffic has also increased tremendously over time (e.g., it has sextupled in Finland between 2003 and 2009 for the kind of Internet traffic data that we use (FICIX)). Our estimates are therefore not inconsistent with previous results in terms of relative marginal effects. This also implies that the estimates in the literature translate into larger numbers in terms of the size of the industries without piracy today than for the periods investigated.
The reform effect estimates for physical music sales using the preferred specification with country-specific time effects are reported in Table 3 . Estimates are also reported for fullprice, mid-price, and budget albums separately, and for sales of albums with domestic and international artists separately. For the different price categories, data is only available for Sweden and Finland. Previous tables indicate that the results are qualitatively similar irrespective of the control country used. The reform estimates for the first six months are all positive and statistically significant at the one percent level for total physical sales and across the different dimensions of partition. The placebo estimates again have different signs, they are much smaller in magnitude, and they are not statistically significant in most cases. The physical sales increase of 33.3 percent is smaller, but close to, the 36.4 percent increase for total music sales. The quarter estimates are all positive and in most cases statistically significant at the one or five percent level for the first two quarters, but they are smaller and mostly statistically insignificant for the last quarter.
The reform effects are heterogeneous; they are larger for cheaper albums. If file sharers have a lower than average willingness to pay, increasing the cost of piracy from a very low level plausibly makes them start buying cheaper albums. The smaller effects on more expensive albums are in line with the fact that piracy tends to be concentrated to albums for which file sharers have a relatively low willingness to pay, as documented by Rob and Waldfogel (2006) .
The reform effects are also larger for domestic albums. This is a plausible pattern if file sharers perceived the risk of prosecution to be higher for domestic albums. We believe that this is the case since previous court cases on piracy in Sweden almost exclusively focused on domestic music and movies.
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The reform effect estimates for digital music sales using the preferred specification with country-specific time effects are reported in Table 4 . Results are also reported for streamed music, non-streamed music downloaded from the Internet, and non-streamed music downloaded to cell phones. For the subcategories, comparable data over time is only available for Sweden. Previous tables indicate that the results are qualitatively similar even without control countries. The reform estimate for the first six months is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level for total digital sales. The digital sales increase of 45.5 percent is larger than, but close to, the 36.4 percent increase for total music sales. Most of this increase consists of an increase in streamed music; for the different subcategories, only streams are statistically significant at the five percent level with a huge increase of 344.3 percent. The placebo estimates have different signs, they are much smaller in magnitude, and they are not statistically significant in most cases. The quarter estimates are all positive and statistically significant at the one percent level for total digital sales, and they increase over time and are even larger in the third quarter. When accounting for the last quarter, the relative increase becomes much larger for digital music than for physical music, although the increase is larger for physical music in absolute terms.
Capacity constraints in streaming services immediately after the reform could be an explanation for the delayed upturn in streamed music. 24 The sudden shift in demand could have triggered a technological expansion in those services that caused further growth in sales even as Internet traffic (as well as piracy, although not to the same degree) recovered. If the technology expansion involves a fixed cost, it may not reverse back as the demand shifts back 25 . Another additional explanation for the persistency of digital sales in the last quarter could be that once people start to use streaming services regularly, it becomes a habit that they continue. 26 In a wider perspective, the reform may have marked a milestone where the digital market seriously started to compete with the physical market.
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Our results are complemented with individual survey data evidence, which is presented in Appendix B. A sample of individuals in Sweden have been asked about their file sharing and music consumption behavior prior to and after the reform. Questions on file sharing include how often the respondents used file sharing sites to download music and whether IPRED has changed their use of those sites. Questions on music consumption include whether consumption behavior changed after IPRED and how knowledge and use of digital streaming services changed after IPRED. The answers corroborate our results that piracy decreased and that music sales increased after the reform. They also indicate that the reform really is the cause of the decrease in piracy and that music consumption increased to compensate for the decrease in piracy. Furthermore, there is evidence that streaming services played a key role.
Movie Sales
The reform effect estimates for movie theater ticket sales are reported in Table 5 , which is similarly organized as Table 2 . The reform estimates are all positive but much smaller than for music sales and not statistically significant in most cases. The placebo estimates are similar in size to the reform estimates and are also not statistically significant in most cases. Precision is, however, not high, and we can only rule out large effects. Given the standard errors in the panel specifications, only true effects of the order of 15 percent or more could be detected at the five percent level. A 95 percent confidence interval around the preferred estimate has an upper bound lower than 30 percent and hence lower than the preferred estimate for total music sales. Eventual effects are hence most likely lower than for total music sales. A possible interpretation of the absence of a statistically significant large effect is that the volume of pirated movies is small. However, several studies document significant movie piracy and given the good Internet infrastructure in Sweden, it seems likely that there is significant movie piracy also in Sweden. A 2009 survey on media habits (SOM 2009) also show that 60 percent of the population in the ages 15-29 download pirated movies in Sweden.
Reform estimates for DVD movie sales are reported in Table 6 . In column 5 we use monthly data for Sweden only. 28 The reform estimates are all positive but much smaller than for music sales and not statistically significant in most cases. The exception is the estimates using monthly data for only Sweden, which indicate a statistically significant reform effect of 21 percent. Although the other specifications produce much smaller point estimates, they do not differ in a statistically significantly way from the Sweden only results due to low precision. The placebo estimates are much smaller than the reform estimates and not statistically significant. The results are thus ambiguous and there is some evidence of a reform effect on DVD sales, although non-robust point estimates and the low precision prevent us from drawing any strong conclusions. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper empirically investigates the effects of piracy on music and movie sales. The Swedish implementation of the IPRED law on April 1, 2009 suddenly increased the risks of piracy. We investigate the subsequent drop in piracy, approximated by the drop in Swedish Internet traffic, and the effects on music and movie sales in Sweden.
We find that the reform decreased Internet traffic by 16 percent, corresponding to a decrease in piracy by 32 percent, during the subsequent six months. It also increased sales of music by 36 percent. Furthermore, it had no statistically significant effects on movie theater ticket sales, while there is mixed evidence on DVD sales, with estimates ranging from zero to a 21 percent increase. Assuming that the marginal effects are constant, these estimates would imply that music sales would be twice the current level in the absence of piracy. Under this rather strong functional form assumption, piracy would account for 80 percent of the drop between 2000 and 2008, which would support the music industry's claims that piracy was the main cause of the decline.
Our results indicate that pirated music is a strong substitute to legal music, whereas the substitutability is less for movies. It is clear that copyright protection is important from the music industry's point of view. The sizeable effects also suggest that there may be important welfare implications of file sharing, but a complete analysis requires estimates of the consumer surplus from piracy and of the sales effects on incentives for creators.
From a dynamic perspective, the immediate decrease in piracy following IPRED caused an increase in the demand for legal music. Probably due to capacity constraints in the digital music market, the immediate increase was largest for physical sales. As the supply of digital music responded to the increased demand, digital sales increased whereas physical sales decreased, which indicates a substitution from physical to digital music. After six months, piracy recovered to a large extent, which resulted in a decrease in the demand for legal music and decreased physical as well as total sales. However, digital sales continued to grow, which indicates that there were further increases in the supply of digital music and that the previous migration to this market was permanent.
From a policy evaluation perspective, IPRED was effective in preventing piracy and in increasing music sales for the first six months. Some of these effects must be attributed to a combination of the law and widespread public interest. The deterrent effect decreased quickly. As no court cases are settled, it is possible that convictions would restore an effect that is more long-lasting. IPRED may also have enhanced the technological developments of the digital music market, which lead to a migration to this market. These effects seem to be longlasting as indicated by persistent digital sales increases even as piracy recovered.
APPENDIX A -HOW INTERNET TRAFFIC WORKS
Each device (server, personal computer, etc.) connected to the Internet has a unique IP address. A collection of adjacent IP addresses is referred to as an IP prefix. In order for data packets to reach their destination, the Internet Routing Table contains a list of possible paths by which a packet can reach a specific IP address.
On a more aggregated level, the Internet can be said to consist of Autonomous Systems (AS). An AS is usually a network operated by a single administration such as an Internet service provider (ISP), a government, or a large corporation. Examples of Autonomous Systems include AT&T, TeliaSonera, Microsoft, Google, and the Swedish University Computer Network (SUNET). Formally, an AS is defined as a group of one or more IP prefixes that have a single and clearly defined routing policy (Hawkinson and Bates 1996) . There are over 30,000 Autonomous Systems in the Internet Routing Table. 29
In order for an Internet user to be able to reach any location on the Internet, Autonomous Systems have to interconnect. This is done through commercial agreements, which are classified as either peering or transit. A peering agreement allows two networks to exchange traffic between each other. In contrast, in a transit agreement one AS pays another AS to carry its traffic to and from the rest of the Internet. Transit agreements are usually used when a small AS needs to connect to the Internet. Traditionally, the Internet is divided into tiers with Tier 1 networks loosely defined as those large networks that tie together the Internet throughout the world. Tier 2 networks are smaller, often regional networks. The Tier 1 networks peer with one another, and the Tier 2 networks buy transit from the Tier 1 networks. Tier 2 networks can often also peer with one another.
Both peering and transit can physically be set up separately between each pair of connected networks, but most of these connections are made at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). An IXP is a physical network infrastructure operated by a single entity with the purpose of facilitating the exchange of Internet traffic between Autonomous Systems (Radovcic 2009 There are several technologies available that can potentially help file sharers hide their activities. Proxy servers work as intermediaries between a user and a web site or other server, so that, e.g., a request for downloading a movie appears to come from the proxy server rather than from the user who is actually downloading the movie. The proxy server then forwards the data to the user. There are networks, such as the Tor Project 32 , that allow users to be completely anonymous online, by bouncing communication between many users of the network. VPN networks are, for our purposes, very similar to proxies, the main difference being that proxies work with specific applications, such as web browsers, while VPN routs all of a user's Internet traffic through an intermediate server. VPN also has encryption built-in, unlike proxies.
APPENDIX B -INDIVIDUAL SURVEY DATA EVIDENCE
To provide additional corroborative evidence to our results, we present some survey-based evidence in this appendix. The survey questions cover file sharing and music behavior prior to and after the IPRED reform in Sweden as well as the reasons for altered behavior. In June 2009, two months after the reform, GfK conducted an investigation of music consumption habits in Sweden. One year later, a follow-up was made. The objective of the surveys was to provide a picture of the music market with respect to consumption behavior and attitudes. The target group was the Swedish population in the age span from 15 to 74 years old. An independent random sample from their Global Online Panel was used for each of the years. Questions and responses on file sharing behavior and the reasons for this behavior are reported in Table A1 . Respondents were asked about their file sharing behavior. Although the 2009 survey was conducted after the reform, the responses on this question mainly reflect prereform behavior as the response alternatives referred to behavior up to a year ago. The 2010 responses reflect the post-reform behavior. The share of those that never file share increased from 57 to 61 percent after the reform, a difference that is statistically significant at the ten percent level. When asked in 2010 about the extent of file sharing compared to the previous year, a statistically significant 52 percent responded that they file share less than last year (it is not totally clear whether the respondents had pre-reform or post-reform behavior in mind when thinking of the last year here). The group that responded that they did file share in 2009 was also asked whether the reform has changed their file sharing behavior. Of this group, 60 percent responded that they have either stopped or decreased their file sharing activities, which is a statistically significant share. The group that responded that they file share less in 2010 than last year was also asked about the reasons for this behavior. The digital streaming music service Spotify, the IPRED reform, and better legal services were the three main reasons, all having statistically significant shares. Of course, Spotify also existed before the reform, and the increased use of it as well as better legal services can be seen as outcomes driven by the reform.
Questions and responses on how music downloads through file sharing have been replaced are reported in Table A2 . The respondents that answered that they file shared less or stopped file sharing due to the reform in 2009 were asked about how they replaced or compensated the music downloaded through file sharing. Almost half of them started to use free ad-financed digital streaming services. However, a statistically significant share did buy more music than previously. To explore their knowledge of different digital music providers, respondents were asked about their knowledge and use of different digital music services in 2009 and 2010. The three largest changes during the year after the reform occurred for digital music streaming services Spotify Free (ad-financed), Spotify Premium, and Sony Ericsson PlayNow. The changes are all statistically significant. This survey evidence alone should, however, not be given too much weight. It provides a before-and-after analysis without accounting for other time effects. A survey data analysis also encounters the problems discussed in the introduction. However, the survey evidence provides corroborative consumption side support to the conclusion in this paper that piracy decreased and music sales increased after the reform.
